The ultimate value of operations research (OR) is making real differences in organizations. Yet little has been written on how one becomes good at doing OR and successful in practice. I propose a framework for understanding what makes good practice and an expert practitioner that encompasses the technical skills required to do OR through the managerial and marketing skills necessary to run an OR enterprise. The potential for success with OR methods depends on the nature of the problem, whether the initial and goal states are well defined or ill defined. The tools of artificial intelligence are useful for organizing the expertise in being a successful practitioner.
F or years Interfaces and the practice section of Operations Research have been publishing articles that present applications of operations research (OR).
These articles have been useful to practitioners, academics, and students, people who want to read about successful examples of OR in practice. The articles fall into the engineering tradition of "We had this problem, and this is how we fixed it." Despite a strong interest in practice in our profession, little effort has been devoted to developing a theory of OR practice. The reason for this is quite simple. The practice publications cover actual practice, and a theory about practice does not fit in most other journals, which focus on algorithms or mathematical abstractions, the core theoretical expertise in our profession. The one exception is the Journal of the Operational Research Society, which has published a stream of articles on practice issues and methods. In this article, I lay out a beginning framework for a theory of practice and suggest some interesting research opportunities in the area.
Formulating such a theory requires drawing from the types of applications that use OR and developing an understanding of the knowledge and the behavior of those who practice OR and their customers. The theory includes heuristics that offer guidance rather than algorithms that find solutions. The psychological and sociological dimensions play a greater role than mathematics, although mathematical skills are a prerequisite.
What I write here cannot be a complete theory and may pose questions others have answered in a different context. Nevertheless, my main goal is to provide some structure and legitimacy to research on the littleunderstood aspect of making the abstractions of OR used and useful, and understanding OR as a business. I cover my ideas in a sequence of three papers. In this paper, I lay out the overall framework and look at some of the useful material from cognitive science. In the second paper, I look at the kinds of expertise necessary for doing good practice. In the third paper, I examine the business of OR and offer a research agenda for building a theory of practice.
The Major Elements of a Theory of Practice
The subject of a theory of practice includes into two major areas, doing OR and the structure of OR as business with the attendant business strategies. Understanding how to do OR projects, especially modeling, requires a knowledge of OR. Research on managing an OR business has much in common with research on managing any technical business in consulting or software, with distinct wrinkles related to the nature of OR tools and methods.
As a starting point for a theory of practitioner expertise, I organize the knowledge and skills of practitioners from the hard mathematical dimensions to the soft interpersonal aspects that are important for being successful practitioners. These are my personal choices; I see this paper as a starting point and not a complete theory of practice. A deeper theory will emerge from extended discussion and debate. My list of individual skills follows:
(1) Knowledge of mathematics, such as duality theory of mathematical programming and properties of stochastic processes, such as Markov chains;
(2) Practical knowledge of tools, programming languages, and computing, for example, simulation languages and modeling systems for optimization; (3) Cognitive skills for mapping problems into models, for example, modeling a refinery unit in a linear or nonlinear program and modeling the flow in a supply chain; (4) Problem-abstraction skills for translating symptoms of a problem into a meaningful definition of the problem;
(5) Management and team skills for organizing and completing projects on time and on budget; (6) Communication skills and the ability to understand customer needs and wants; (7) Marketing and strategic-positioning skills that expand the field into new customer classes and areas and develop businesses, and the ability to recognize what environments are conducive to the successful implementation of OR; and (8) Relationship management skills for building a social network of contacts on the technology and business sides of practice.
Because the standard curricula in schools and the interests of OR practitioners guarantee expertise in the first two items in the list, I will not discuss them. I focus on items (3) and (4) because that is where I have experience.
Items (5) through (8) have been covered in general terms in the literature on organizational behavior, marketing, and business strategy. The Project Management Institute offers certification in management and team skills (item 5), mostly driven by problems in software development. Our field poses a communications and marketing challenge in that what we provide is intangible to our customers. The main unsolved issue is developing ways of communicating and marketing intangible solutions to business problems when most managers do not understand the mathematics involved and other disciplines offer tangible approaches. Miser (1993) offers a start, and Ormerod (2002) and Overmeer et al. (1998) provide deeper discussions. Building and maintaining social networks is central to success because most business comes through client referrals, and the best way to understand new directions in a field is through social networks.
To understand the expertise and skills required for items (3) and (4), I draw from artificial intelligence (AI) and cognitive science. Cognitive science is useful because it provides a model for the manifestations of results-oriented thinking.
Although AI has not delivered on the promise of automating complex knowledge activities (Schon 1983 critiques AI and quantitative techniques in general), the core concepts of AI provide a useful framework for organizing what practitioners know and presenting strategies for understanding and solving problems. In this paper, I make no attempt to automate the magic of creating novel OR solutions. Instead, I examine ways for structuring thinking to enhance the odds of a person developing a novel OR solution. The organizing concepts I use are schemas, procedures, and analogies.
Schemas, Semantic Nets, and Frames
Schemas, also known as semantic nets, are a construct in AI that allow us to categorize information. They contain objects and relationships among objects. For example, apple has an is-a relationship with fruit, and the different kinds of apples have relationships among themselves based on selection and crossbreeding. We construct these nets naturally, and the level of detail we carry around in a semantic net depends on our interests and activities. When we consult, we bring our large semantic net of models and modeling techniques to the table along with a semantic net of applications, and the customer brings a large semantic net about the business. If these semantic nets mesh properly, the result is a successful consulting project. Our schemas evolve with experience, and we may never think of them as explicit in our memories. Nevertheless, they are very real. When we construct semantic nets, we also select exemplars of the categories. An exemplar has features that we view as typical of the entities in the category. These features are organized in what is called a frame in the artificial-intelligence literature. Elements in the frame for a linear program are activities, constraints, and an objective function. An exemplar is the classic productmix model.
In the area of operations problems, the following schema categorizes an organization's activities:
(1) Tasks, individual tasks at each stage of a process;
(2) Processes, sequences of tasks as in the assembly of a product; and (3) Systems, the ways in which processes interact within major pieces of organizations, such as a supply chain.
The boundaries between adjacent categories are not hard. Instead, this categorization is best treated as a functional device for deciding on approaches to problem solving. Tasks consist of actions by one person. Processes are collections of tasks that we can visualize using simple charts as with material flows in a factory or information flows in billing systems. When studying processes, we have to judge whether we can use simple process-flow charts to describe the processes or we have to use queuing models or simulation to address uncertainties, adding more elements to the schema. Business-process reengineering is mainly standard process analysis with an if statement added to the process diagram. Tasks have an is-part-of relationship with processes. The tasks can be further differentiated by the kinds of tasks. For example, process-flow charts differentiate the task of moving an item from the task of performing an operation and, most critically, indicate when nothing is being done. With systems, we often have to use such tools as linear and integer programming to cope with our cognitive limits in dealing with large numbers of component interactions. From a functional perspective, we can think of tasks as black boxes in a process under study and the process as part of a larger system. Schemas can become very elaborate. In OR, we can construct a schema of the various models by first categorizing them as optimization or descriptive models. We can further categorize optimization models as linear, integer, nonlinear, and dynamic programming models. The descriptive models can be subdivided into analytic models (such as spreadsheets and queuing models) and simulation models. We can create other relationships among categories. For example, separable programming links linear and nonlinear programming, and one can combine simulation and optimization in a model. For each model category, we have frames that define an abstraction of the model and list application areas. A frame for a mathematical program includes the goal, the decisions, the objective function, and the constraints.
Problems also have their own schemas. To conduct a successful practice project, we must connect a problem as abstracted in a problem schema to a class of models in the model schema.
Procedures
The body of mathematics is a highly structured logical framework. The logic, however, is the product of people using heuristic procedures. In How to Solve It, Polya (1957) describes heuristic methods for constructing mathematical proofs. In two pages (xvi and xvii), he summarizes the book in a procedure for formulating a theorem and attacking a proof. I restate it as follows:
(1) Understand the problem (look for the deep structure).
(a) What is the unknown? (b) Visualize the problem by drawing a figure. (c) Examine the conditions (sufficient, redundant, or contradictory?).
(2) Devise a plan (construct analogies, develop a search strategy). This procedure is a heuristic, and Polya recommends further heuristics for each step. He poses two questions: "What can I do?" and "What do I need?" The first question in the AI vocabulary is forward search and the second is backwards search.
We can see an overall guiding procedure in the main steps of Polya's heuristic. The theorems and proofs of mathematics form a semantic net that builds out from the axioms. We can draw on the relevant semantic net to develop a plan of action and then execute the plan, checking to see if it worked. This theme is repeated over and over again in all the facets of modeling and decision making that I examine here.
Procedures can be less formal yet helpful. Pidd (1999) offers a checklist that can be treated as a procedure for understanding problems from Rudyard Kipling's Just So Stories: This poem is a checklist to stimulate problem understanding.
Let us examine some of the procedures used in the practice of OR. Most books that contain overviews of OR/MS include lists of steps for building and using models. A typical list is as follows:
(1) Recognize the symptoms. All of the steps require some form of cognition, and the only purely mathematical step is Step 6. Furthermore, although the steps are written down sequentially, to solve real problems we continually cycle back to earlier steps. After each step should be the step: Check whether your conclusions or assumptions make sense. If not, return to a previous step.
Step 1 requires the problem owner or OR practitioner to be aware that something is not working well or could work better. Often people in an organization do not recognize the symptoms of problems because they have lived with them so long that the situations seem normal or they no longer realize what is possible.
Step 2 is not a pure observation of the facts. OR/MS practitioners are conditioned to look for answers to problems using elaborate models. Yet, in most situations, the answer is obvious once we frame the problem and explore the options properly. Keeney (2000) estimates that only 0.4 percent of important decision problems require the use of a decision tree. When we need a model, we choose between a representation that emphasizes either the inherent randomness of the situation or the deterministic relationships among system components. That is, we search through our schema of models and their properties. Deciding which approach to take is not as obvious as it may seem at first glance because most situations requiring OR/MS techniques have both stochastic elements and complex interrelationships. The model validation step allows us to test the assumptions underlying the formulation. These tests may take on the character of statistical exercises in the case of simulation models. However, what we test and why is a direct result of our using human judgment to sort out what is and is not worth testing.
Analyzing results consists of collating the numerical output and also investing the numbers with meaning. In communicating results, we exercise judgment about what the message should be and how others will receive and use it. We analyze results by framing them in the context of their organizational implications. For example, Andrews et al. (1996) measured service in a complex queuing system using an average service time, the textbook measure. We used a simulation model to generate average service times and service-time distributions. The distributions became the most important results after we recognized the implications of these service distributions for the customers' inventories and their safety-stock requirements as critical elements of service quality. The greater the variability of service, the greater the safety stocks the customers would have to carry.
Incidentally, we were the third group the client company approached. An ex-post obvious formulation of the problem was not so obvious a priori. The first group, a major international consulting firm, offered to study the problem for $250,000 and then produce a formal proposal to solve the problem. The second group saw the problem as an integerprogramming scheduling problem that would cost over $100,000 to solve. We profitably delivered a solution for $35,000 and developed an extended relationship with the customer.
One can have alternative steps in the analysis process and vary the emphasis. Woolsey (1998) places far more emphasis on the exploration and problem definition phases (Steps 2 and 3). His primary tenet is that one cannot and should not model a business process or provide a recommendation unless one actually does all of the steps of the process; he insists on developing total familiarity with the process, not just observing the operations without participating.
He is working from a rule based on his view that only the people who do the process know what is really going on, and once one knows the process, one will recognize the key step of the process wherein the problem lies. His core procedure, after the symptoms indicate the presence of a problem, can be summarized as follows:
(1) Do the process yourself until you understand it as well as those who do it for a living.
(2) Observe where the problem lies, typically a single step in the process.
(3) Recommend a fix. Doing the process while following Pidd's checklist to question every step clarifies where the problem lies. This procedure is most appropriate when the focus is on the process, not in a situation in which the organization has good processes and is looking for systems gains. In fact, this procedure works for more business situations than the first procedure we laid out, because organizations have achieved many of the recent increases in productivity by looking at processes, driven by new technologies, rather than systems.
In The Craft of Decision Modeling, Rivett (1994) also recommends procedures and precepts for analyzing business and other organizational problems. His steps parallel those Polya (1957) lists in How to Solve It for solving mathematical problems and proving theorems.
I can lay out a procedure for formulating linear programs that is useful for students new to the subject. I structure it as a checklist:
(1) What is the goal? Wagner's questions go beyond the model-formulation steps by starting with an understanding of the problem and exploring the relationship between the model and the real world. His questions force us to decide on the appropriateness of linear programming at the beginning of a project and to assess the value of the modeling exercise.
All of the steps of the various modeling procedures I have listed can be grouped into the steps of a universal procedure:
(1) Develop an understanding of the situation. What differentiates the various procedures is not their general structure but their specialization to the subject at hand and the expertise required to be effective at each step. The problem and model schemas contain much of this information.
Even though we think of ourselves as optimizers, we use heuristics and follow procedures just like everyone else. Our heuristics and procedures differ in specifics. The procedures we use are for abstracting situations and setting up models that we subsequently solve. That is very different from attacking problems directly, the method used for most problems in the world and the one that students initially follow when given OR/MS problems.
Pleasing and attracting clients can be structured as a procedure using the discussion in Corbett et al. (1995) :
(1) Stay ahead of management's specific concerns by predicting and addressing them.
(2) Get to know the client, the problem, and the context in which it emerges.
(3) Start with a small, simple prototype for one client.
(4) Generalize the model by modularizing components.
(5) Invest time, manage risk, and look for codevelopers.
(6) Move from one client to another within a problem domain and become an expert in the domain.
(7) Continue to refine the model by addressing unique client concerns.
(8) Ask new clients to build model development into the projects.
(9) Develop individual skills and organizationbased competencies by specializing in a domain and its critical problems.
(10) Keep control over the overall development. Can procedures be overused? I have been struck by the extent to which authors of popular books on creativity charge their readers to follow rigid procedures; perhaps the world needs a self-help book entitled Seven Rigid Rules for Free Thinking. I have come to the conclusion that as long as the rules induce observation, questioning, and reframing, they help. However, there are no guarantees that their users will gain deep insights into problems.
Analogies and Deep Structures
Learning procedures and relying on schemas to organize the realities of situations to be modeled are not sufficient to ensure success as practitioners. Developing analogies is central to good modeling. Miser (1993) developed a diagram in which the induction step is drawing analogies (Figure 1) .
Psychologists have developed an extensive literature on constructing analogies for algebra word problems through researching the subject of how to teach mathematics to high-school students and college undergraduates. Mayer (1992) and Chen (2002) cover the most important literature on analogical reasoning in this context. Murphy and Panchanadam (1999) have looked at ways to help students construct analogies in formulating linear-programming models. This literature is relevant to the psychology of OR/MS because the basic mechanisms used to formulate algebra word problems apply to formulating models no matter how complex. What this literature shows is that successful students read the whole problem and develop an understanding of the underlying structure of the problem before trying to formulate the algebraic model. Once a modeler understands the underlying structure of the problem, he or she can recognize similar problems and transfer information about the solution methods to the problem at hand. Alternatively, a modeler can recognize a basic principle and apply a solution method based on it.
These are analogical processes. An analogical process consists of the following steps:
(1) Observe the problem and abstract the deep structure of the problem.
(2) Select a problem with the same or a similar deep structure from the problem schema.
(3) Apply the solution procedure for the known problem to the new problem.
(4) Evaluate the solution to see if it is satisfactory. Deep structure differs from surface structure, which is the physical context of the problem. For example, the problem of determining the mix of cars to produce in a plant has a different surface structure from the problem of determining the mix of chairs to produce, because one is about automobiles and the other is about furniture. However, the two have the same deep structure; they are product-mix problems.
Essentially, a deep structure is an abstraction that points to a solution or a model. Typically, the abstraction concerns relationships between entities and the entities' activities rather than the entities themselves. We learn what works as deep structure from experiences that lead us to build an elaborate mental schema of abstractions.
By understanding the deep structure of a problem, we can connect the problem with the model. The ability to abstract the deep structure of a problem is a core expertise of practitioners. We learn to determine deep structures through trial and error, by exploring alternative abstractions. The aphorism about having a hammer and seeing every problem as a nail expresses the difficulty of seeing the deep structure.
The ability to abstract and construct analogies is the skill practitioners need most to build useful models, and they learn it through practice, just as those with theoretical interests develop the ability to prove new theorems from years of experience in writing proofs for homework problems. Sometimes a modeler must make a few tries before hitting on the right abstraction. For example, when Baumol (1965, p. 350) tried to model the optimal amount of cash on hand at a bank using the economic-order-quantity model, the analogy did not work. The model failed because cash flows in randomly as well as out.
Successful analogizing expands our problem and model schemas, known as schema induction in AI. We can then see problems in new ways, which is what makes papers on practice interesting, not the novelty of the mathematics. Each success contributes to schema induction because the expanded schema reduces the intellectual distance between new problems and new solutions. This increases the odds of successful new formulations and further expansion of the schema. A good example of schema induction to meet computational needs is the reformulation of an air-network model at UPS by Armacost et al. (2004) that dramatically reduced the number of integer variables. Making a schema explicit is also a research problem; Armstrong (2001) describes an example in forecasting.
Nothing I have written about here can substitute for the creative spark that leads to truly novel models. As Dartnall (2002) points out, cognitive science says nothing about how to develop knowledge, only how to organize knowledge. To get at the deeper aspects of creativity, we need a model of selfknowledge and mental simulation. Cognitive science can describe what we know but says far less about the creative aspects of problem solving. Dartnall considers the work Hummel and Holyoak (2002) describe on schema induction through analogy to be a "promissory note" to solve this problem.
The Structure of Decision-Making Situations
How we make decisions and the difficulty of making decisions depends on the nature of the decisions, what we know, when we know things, and how intertwined the decisions are with our values. Smith (1988) makes the distinction between decisions to make choices based on utilities and probabilities, and problem solving, where the decisions are about how to best achieve objectives. Hammond et al. (1999) write about making choices. I focus on making decisions in the context of problem solving.
We can categorize OR/MS problem-solving situations and methods using a framework Mayer (1992) describes. Smith (1989) proposes an alternative framework. Mayer categorizes problems by how well defined or ill defined they are. They can have welldefined initial states (WIS) or poorly-defined initial states (PIS) and well-defined goal states (WGS) or poorly-defined goal states (PGS). Science is based on WIS and PGS in that scientists know the current state of knowledge in their fields but do not know where their experiments will lead them. Engineering and technology development are based on WIS and WGS in that both the current technologies and the desired products or functionalities are known. What is unknown is how to get from the current state to the desired state. Issues addressed by senior managers start with PIS, and the managers search for solutions in PGS because they focus on the ill-defined questions related to the strategic situation of their organizations and use judgment developed from years of experience. Mayer (1992, p. 6 ) also categorizes solution methods and their attendant thought processes by problem type based on Greeno and Simon (1988) :
Problems of transformation as in looking for a sequence of operations that produces the goal state as in converting the statement of a homework problem into algebra;
Problems of arrangement as in arranging the elements in a way that solves the problem as with anagrams;
Problems of inducing structure as in finding the pattern in a sequence of numbers; and Evaluation of deductive arguments as in proving theorems.
To these I add problems of search and selection, where one has to find something or choose from an available set of options.
The kinds of problems and the kinds of thought processes form a two-dimensional table we can use to categorize problems and their solution methods (Table 1) .
The conceptual complexity of the problems increases as the ambiguity of the initial and goal states increases. Also, we cannot use deductive arguments without a well-defined goal state. The more ambiguous the goal state and the greater the breadth of the subject area, the more executive the problem. That something is conceptually simple does not mean that it is technically easy, which is why I include the proof of Fermat's last theorem as an example. Solutions to ambiguous problems require judgment more than technical knowledge, and such problems require breadth of life experience rather than depth of technical knowledge. Search problems, such as debugging, are an exception in that, while being technical, they have poorly defined goal states but are technical in that you do not know what you are looking for until you find it. Once you find your solution to a technical problem, it is clear that you have a solution, which is not always the case for solutions to problems of business strategy. Table 1 shows how soft and traditional OR/MS complement each other in that soft OR is a tool to help understand problems with poorly defined initial and goal states. We look at this in greater detail in the second paper (Murphy 2005) .
When OR/MS projects fail, they usually fail because the players take the initial or goal states as well defined. Woolsey focuses on making sure one knows the initial state. Rivett (1994, p. 121) states as his Principle 5 that one should expect the objectives to change during the study. He also notes that choosing the different goal of relaxing constraints rather than optimizing within them can often improve the payoff. A classic example of this sort is the economic-orderquantity model. Western businesses took the setup cost as given. Toyota did not and as a result came up with just-in-time production systems. Rivett (1994, p. 94 ) also notes, "The person who invites the research may turn out to be an entry point to a larger problem to be solved at a higher level."
Good mathematicians and computer scientists have their important successes at earlier ages than good managers do because they work on well-defined, unambiguous problems that require deep knowledge in a narrow domain that they have spent their youths mastering. Managers learn their jobs as adults, their domains are broad, and their environments contain ambiguities. Experienced managers make judgments based on a broad range of experiences. Schon (1983, Chapter 2) would label the first three columns of Table 1 as problems amenable to "technical rationality" and say that the fourth column requires "knowing-in-action" or the product of reflection on previous action. Table 1 highlights ways the typical academic differs from the typical practitioner. The academic is comfortable working on well-defined problems with welldefined goals and inducing mathematical structure. OR/MS practitioners tend to work on transforming, arranging, and structuring well-or poorly-defined problems with well-or poorly-defined goals (but not both poorly defined). That academics confine their research largely to well-defined problems does not denigrate their contribution. Good algorithms are important for solving real problems. Furthermore, when a practitioner comes to an academic for assistance, the subject is usually technical, not modeling expertise.
Most modeling requires inducing structure. Accenture and IBM in consulting tend to work on problems that are wholly or partly well defined with their service businesses, while such firms as McKinsey and the Boston Consulting Group, in their strategy businesses, concentrate on poorly defined problems. Interestingly, technical consulting projects in which the client company leaves organizational and strategic decisions to the consultant typically have significant cost overruns because the consultants misperceive the initial state and goals of the project, leading to substantial rework, or they enlarge the problem to increase their revenues.
Conclusions
We need the tools of cognitive science to structure OR problems. A colleague once said that AI could never replace OR because OR optimizes and AI uses heuristics. Actually, we use heuristics to categorize and structure problems, and then optimize models specified through design heuristics. As the final step, we draw the analogy from the model to the real problem and apply the model results to the problem.
We may ask why we should use the tools of cognitive science to study practice when AI has yet to fulfill its technology promises of several decades ago. The reason is quite simple. In the early days of AI, the thought was that machines could replace people in complex cognitive tasks. That has not happened. In our field, the intelligence resides in the practitioner. Nonetheless, the models of cognitive science provide a useful framework for developing a theory of how successful practitioners think and how the deep structures of problems make them amenable to solution using OR methods.
The practice literature in OR is dominated by examples of practitioners doing OR, describing completed projects, and typically not including the false starts or the reasons for the judgment calls that led to the final model. The lack of articles concerning theories of practice and successful practice methods reflects the skills and interests of OR researchers more than it does the subjects' lack of potential as research areas.
We come from the engineering tradition of doing rather than from a research tradition of observation and synthesis. Yet, especially for faculty members of business schools, engaging in observation and synthesis can be a fruitful path of research that would be of value for practitioners and the students who are future customers of OR. The research possibilities that come out of the topics I have discussed are:
(1) Elaborating, expanding, and revising the individual skills I listed;
(2) Examining the commonalities and differences in skills and mindsets in OR compared to other technical areas;
(3) Surveying the applications of OR to fully understand the deep structures that led to modeling choices and to document the deep structures that are relevant to industries; (4) Developing tools to facilitate the formulation of analogies to help students and beginning practitioners to develop better models; (5) Developing or enhancing frameworks (for example, Table 1 ) to explicate where OR works and where other approaches work better to highlight opportunities in OR; and (6) Determining what OR tools are appropriate for different industries.
In the next paper in this series, I examine the expertise that makes an OR practitioner good at doing OR. In the last paper, I look at the business of OR.
